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to	 24.1%	 ownership	 by	 blockholders.	 This	 reduced	 concentration	 may	 affect	 the	
potential	for	long-term	oriented	shareholders	negatively.	
• In	 the	 Netherlands,	 financial	 institutions,	 including	 pension	 funds,	 are	 relatively	
unimportant	 as	 blockholders	 in	 Dutch-listed	 companies,	 while	 individuals	 are	
blockholders	with	the	largest	average	blocks	of	shares.		
• Further	 analyses	 show	 that	 46%	 of	 the	 blockholdings	 in	 2016	 have	 been	 established	
more	than	10	years	earlier.		







group	of	 respondents,	which	are	different	 from	the	blockholders	 identified	 in	 the	 first	
part.	
• The	 survey	 is	 largely	 conducted	among	Dutch-based	 investors,	while	80%	of	 investors	
are	foreign	based.	Hedge	funds,	an	important	group	of	short-term	oriented	and	activist	









be	 important	 for	 long-term	value	creation,	pension	 funds	and	 insurers	 rank	social	and	
environmental	factors	significantly	higher	than	investment	funds.	
• Most	investors	argue	that	long-term	value	creation	can	only	be	realised	by	investing	in	
and	 engaging	 with	 companies	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 adding	 value	 over	 the	 long-term,	
thereby	having	a	positive	or	at	least	a	less	negative	effect	on	society.	Investors	want	to	








is	 the	 investment	 belief	 that	 long-term	 value	 creation	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	
shareholder	returns.	Stakeholder	oriented	investors	feel	 it	 is	their	obligation	to	society	
and	invest	significant	resources	in	measuring	the	benefits	of	long-term	value	creation.	
• It	 is	 easier	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	 creation	 for	 concentrated	portfolios	 rather	 than	
(large)	diversified	portfolios.	Moreover,	a	long	investment	chain	complicates	alignment	
on	 long-term	value	creation,	while	 family	offices	with	concentrated	 investments	and	a	
long-term	 vision	 (without	 frequent	 performance	 benchmarking)	 are	 able	 to	 engage	
effectively	with	companies	on	long-term	value	creation.	
• A	key	barrier	 to	 long-term	value	creation	 is	periodic	benchmarking.	This	 is	particularly	






• Respondents’	 indication	that	they	pursue	 long-term	value	creation	 is	 inconsistent	with	
the	 wide-spread	 practice	 of	 measuring	 performance	 against	 a	 market	 return	
benchmark.	
• Another	barrier	is	the	traditional	education	of	portfolio	managers	with	a	strong	belief	in	
markets,	 which	 can	 foster	 short-termism.	 Next,	 prudential	 supervision	 requires	 large	
institutional	 investors	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 certain	 risk	 profile,	 diversification	 requirements	







• Inadequate	corporate	governance	 is	an	 important	 trigger	 for	 shareholder	engagement	
for	 all	 investor	 groups.	 For	 investment	 funds,	 the	most	 important	 trigger	 to	 become	
active	 is	underperformance	of	a	company.	 In	contrast,	 socially	 irresponsible	corporate	
behaviour	 is	 an	 important	 trigger	 for	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 and	 stakeholder	
oriented	investors.	
• Engagement	 is	 the	 preferred	 strategy	 for	 all	 investor	 groups.	Most	 investors	 indicate	
that	 (continuous)	dialogues	with	portfolio	companies	are	most	 important.	They	 rather	
engage	in	private	(behind	the	scenes)	than	in	public.	
• For	 most	 large	 funds,	 corporate	 governance	 specialists	 decide	 on	 the	 engagement	















• The	 research	 suggests	 several	 conditions	 for	 investors	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 pursue	 an	
investment	strategy	aimed	at	 long-term	value	creation.	Investors	can	realise	long-term	








active	 investment	 strategy	 is	 often	 based	 on	 fundamental	 analysis	 of	 the	 invested	
companies.	 Blockholders	 have	 the	 voting	 power	 to	 influence	 firms,	 while	 reduced	
liquidity	makes	voting	with	the	feet	expensive	





(with	 minimum	 tracking	 error)	 does	 not	 allow	 (large)	 deviations	 from	 the	 market	
benchmark.	 It	 is	 also	 difficult	 to	 have	 sufficient	 knowledge	 about,	 and	 really	 engage	
with,	multiple	companies	in	the	benchmark	portfolio.	
• A	fifth	condition	is	alignment	of	the	mandate	of	the	asset	owner	or	client	and	the	asset	
manager	 on	 the	 long	 term.	 The	 survey	 indicates	 that	 asset	 managers	 are	 primarily	
motivated	 by	 their	 beneficiaries	 (asset	 owners	 or	 clients)	 to	 pursue	 long-term	 value	
creation.	 Another	 important	 motive	 is	 the	 investment	 belief	 that	 long-term	 value	
creation	has	a	positive	impact	on	shareholder	returns.	
• A	sixth	condition	is	to	keep	the	investment	chain	(between	parties	and	within	parties)	as	
short	 as	 possible,	 as	 each	 player	 in	 the	 investment	 chain	 may	 hold	 the	 next	 player	
accountable	to	a	shorter	period.	
• The	 development	 of	 Dutch	 firms	 where	 ownership	 concentration	 is	 reduced	 -	 as	
reported	in	the	data	on	blockholdings	-	thus	affects	the	potential	for	long-term	oriented	
shareholders	 negatively.	 Simultaneously,	 shareholdings	 in	 Dutch	 corporations	 are	









with	 take-over	defenses,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 in	 the	debate	 about	 the	
protection	of	exchange-listed	firms	against	hostile	takeovers	that	these	protections	are	
most	relevant	for	firms	with	fewer	blockholders.	
3. To	pursue	 long-term	value	creation,	 it	 is	 important	 that	asset	owners,	asset	managers	
and	 companies	 are	 aligned	 on	 a	 long-term	mandate,	 which	 includes	 ESG	 factors	 and	








6. New	 investment	 approaches	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 differently	 educating	 (young)	
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role	 as	 stakeholder	with	 strategic	 interests	 in	 the	 firm.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 large	 shareholders	
have	the	voting	power	in	shareholders’	meeting	to	affect	voting	outcomes.	On	the	other	hand,	
large	 shareholders	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 long-term	 performance	 of	 corporations,	 because	
under	 normal	 conditions,	 they	 can	 only	 sell	 their	 block	 of	 shares	 at	 a	 discount.	 Thus,	 in	
corporations,	the	board	and	large	shareholders	face	a	long-term	mutual	dependency.		




as	 financiers	 and	 owners	 of	 the	 firm’s	 share	 capital,	 as	 well	 as	 engagement	 partners	 in	 the	
shareholder	meetings.	
The	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 report	 is	 to	 document	 the	 presence	 and	 dynamics	 of	 large	











We	 first	 conduct	 a	 quantitative	 study	 on	 the	 type	 of	 shareholders	 and	 percentage	 of	
shareholdings.	Using	 the	public	 register	of	AFM,	 the	 large	 shareholders	 (defined	as	holding	5	
percent	or	more	of	the	shares)	of	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies	are	identified.	The	types	of	
large	shareholders	and	the	size	of	their	shareholdings	are	specified	from	2008	to	2016,	building	
on	 the	 earlier	 study	 on	 shareholders	 from	 1992	 to	 2007	 by	 Van	 der	 Elst,	 De	 Jong	 and	
Raaijmakers	 (2007).	 The	 sums	 of	 the	 large	 shareholdings	 are	 identified	 using	 the	 disclosures	
	 8	
with	 the	 AFM.	 The	 remaining	 free	 float	 and	 trading	 of	 the	 shares	 is	 also	 calculated,	 as	 the	
fraction	of	shares	not	held	by	blockholders.1	
Following	 the	 revealed	 preference	 theory,	 we	 first	 investigate	 the	 preferences	 of	 large	




see	 that	 large	 shareholders	 care	about	 long-term	value	creation?	What	are	 the	dilemmas	 for	
shareholders?	
The	latter	questions	are	investigated	using	a	survey	among	a	selected	set	of	large	shareholders	
and	 selected	 interviews	 (in	 particular	 institutional	 investors).	 The	 Monitoring	 Committee,	
Eumedion	and	DUFAS	have	assisted	in	approaching	large	shareholders.	
Finally,	 we	 investigate	 shareholder	 voting	 behaviour	 at	 a	 selection	 of	 annual	 shareholder	
meetings.	 The	 voting	 behaviour	 will	 be	 analysed	 for	 relevant	 agenda	 items.	 Where	 data	 is	
available,	we	will	also	investigate	the	arguments	used	by	the	different	types	of	shareholders	to	





1	 Alternative	 definitions	 of	 free	 float	 include	 corrections	 for	 shares	 held	 by	 specific	 non-blockholding	













that	71%	of	 the	 shares	of	Dutch	 firms	are	held	by	 foreign	 investors.2	Eumedion	has	 reported	




Ownership	data.	Ownership	data	 is	based	on	 the	 yearly	overview	of	disclosed	block	holdings	
from	 1992	 onwards	 published	 by	 Het	 Financieele	 Dagblad	 and	 the	 public	 database	 Wet	









of	 shares	 outstanding	 and	 weekly	 trading	 volumes	 have	 been	 collected	 from	DATASTREAM.	
Additionally,	 the	 market	 values	 for	 all	 companies	 have	 been	 retrieved.	 For	 companies	 with	
cross-listings,	 the	 values	 from	 the	 stock	exchange	where	most	of	 the	 company’s	 shares	have	
been	 traded	 has	 been	 selected.	 Liquidity	 has	 been	 computed	 by	 dividing	 the	weekly	 trading	
volume	 by	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 outstanding	 in	 the	 respective	weeks.	 Naturally,	 due	 to	 the	






Takeover	 defenses.	 The	 data	 on	 takeover	 defenses	 present	 in	 Dutch	 corporates	 has	 been	
collected	 from	 the	 Gids	 bij	 de	 Officiële	 Prijscourant,	 the	 Effectengids	 and	 the	 periodical	
overview	 provided	 by	 Eumedion.	 The	 defenses	 included	 in	 the	 analysis	 consist	 of	 Protective	
Preference	Shares,	Priority	 Shares,	 and	 	Certificates.	 The	most	 common	 takeover	defenses	 in	
2016	were	protective	preferred	shares.	This	defence	mechanism	is	defined	as	the	existence	of	a	
foundation	 affiliated	 with	 the	 company	 that	 owns	 call	 options	 on	 preferred	 shares	 in	 the	
company	 that	would	dilute	 the	ownership	of	 the	 existing	 shareholders	 by	 at	 least	 50%	upon	
exercising	 the	 option.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 foundations,	 or	 Stichtingen,	 is	 to	 ensure	 the	
continuity	of	the	company’s	operations	in	accordance	with	the	Rhineland	stakeholder-model.	In	
the	absence	of	blockholders	that	own	substantial	stakes	 in	companies,	takeover	defenses	can	
be	 used	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 shield	 the	 companies	 from	 unwanted	 takeovers.	 They	 are	 thus	
expected	to	be	a	substitute	for	blockholders.		
Data	 Limitations.	The	 year-end	ownership	 levels	 are	 derived	 from	 shareholders’	 notifications	
that	are	filed	throughout	the	year	and	come	with	a	set	of	limitations.		
Firstly,	shareholders	need	not	report	a	change	in	ownership	if	the	change	does	not	cross	one	of	
the	 thresholds	 established	 by	 the	 AFM.	 Therefore,	 the	 established	 year-end	 holdings	 are	 in	
many	 cases	 an	 approximation	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 two	 thresholds	 rather	 than	 an	 exact	
measure	of	ownership.	However,	this	approximation	is	reasonable	for	three	main	reasons:		






for	 a	 longer	 period,	 because	 the	 cross-section	 is	 based	 on	 accumulated	 notifications,	 not	 on	
periodic	 reporting.	 In	 particular,	 a	 single	 unreported	 divestment	 by	 a	 shareholder	 has	 a	
substantial	impact	on	the	ownership	stake	captured	by	the	analysis.	Since	ownership	levels	are	
derived	 from	reported	changes	 in	ownership,	a	blockholder	 that	divests	without	 reporting	 its	
divestment	 will	 persist	 as	 a	 blockholder	 in	 perpetuity.	 This	 results	 in	 a	 systematic	 risk	 of	
overstated	 ownership.	 In	 order	 to	 mitigate	 this	 risk,	 the	 ownership	 levels	 resulting	 from	




significant	 events	 that	 might	 occur	 during	 a	 particular	 year.	 This	 limitation	 is	 particularly	









law,	with	 their	main	 listing	at	 the	Euronext	Amsterdam	exchange,	but	 the	set	also	 includes	a	
small	set	of	non-Dutch	firms	with	ownership	reporting	requirements	because	their	shares	are	
traded	 at	 the	 Euronext	Amsterdam	exchange.	We	 include	 all	 blockholdings	 of	 5%	 and	 above	





		 Mean	 StDev	 Min	 Median	 Max	
Blockholders	 24.1	 24.1	 0.0	 16.0	 88.7	
Free	float	 75.9	 24.1	 11.3	 84.0	 100.0	
Number	of	blockholders	 2.3	 2.2	 0	 2	 9	
Pension	funds	 0.6	 2.3	 0.0	 0.0	 13.3	
Venture	capitalists	 2.5	 9.7	 0.0	 0.0	 65.8	
Banks	 1.6	 4.8	 0.0	 0.0	 32.6	
Insurance	companies	 1.4	 4.1	 0.0	 0.0	 21.7	
Other	financials	 8.9	 13.9	 0.0	 0.0	 76.2	
Non-financial	firm	 2.6	 11.2	 0.0	 0.0	 71.2	
Persons	 6.0	 14.2	 0.0	 0.0	 80.8	
Government	 0.2	 1.8	 0.0	 0.0	 19.3	
Other/undefined	 0.3	 1.4	 0.0	 0.0	 10.1	
	
In	the	set	of	firms,	on	average	24.1%	of	the	shares	are	held	by	shareholders	with	a	stake	of	over	




The	 financial	 institutions	 (pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	 banks)	 are	 relatively	
unimportant	as	blockholders	 in	 the	Netherlands.	The	average	blockholding	 is	as	 low	as	0.6%,	





most	likely	include	investment	vehicles	of	 individual	 investors.	The	next	largest	is	persons,	 i.e.	
individual	shareholders.		
In	 the	 Netherlands	 non-financial	 firms	 are	 not	 important	 shareholders	 (2.6%	 on	 average),	
because	cross-holdings	are	not	widespread,	compared	to	for	example	Italy	or	France.		
In	 Table	 2.2	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 average	 ownership	 over	 2006-2016	 is	 shown.	 The	
blockholdings	have	decreased	over	the	eleven	years,	from	34.6%	to	24.1%.	In	the	composition	




		 2016	 2015	 2014	 2013	 2012	 2011	 2010	 2009	 2008	 2007	 2006	
Blockholders	(aggregate)	 24.1	 26.2	 28.4	 29.5	 28.8	 29.5	 31.8	 35.1	 35.6	 34.6	 34.6	
Free	float	 75.9	 73.8	 71.6	 70.5	 71.2	 70.5	 68.2	 64.9	 64.4	 65.4	 65.4	
Number	of	blockholders	 2.3	 2.6	 2.9	 3.1	 3.0	 3.1	 3.3	 3.3	 3.5	 3.4	 3.3	
Pension	funds	 0.6	 0.4	 0.7	 0.5	 0.4	 0.4	 0.4	 0.4	 0.9	 0.8	 0.8	
Venture	capitalists	 2.5	 1.9	 1.3	 1.0	 0.6	 0.7	 0.6	 0.9	 1.0	 1.1	 1.2	
Banks	 1.6	 2.2	 2.7	 2.4	 2.6	 2.5	 3.0	 3.0	 3.4	 3.6	 3.9	
Insurance	companies	 1.4	 1.8	 2.3	 2.6	 2.7	 2.8	 2.7	 2.7	 3.0	 2.4	 2.4	
Other	financials	 8.9	 10.0	 9.9	 10.7	 10.5	 10.6	 11.9	 13.9	 14.1	 13.7	 12.4	
Non-financial	firms	 2.6	 2.3	 2.6	 3.4	 3.1	 3.3	 3.1	 3.0	 3.0	 2.9	 3.9	
Persons	 6.0	 6.9	 8.1	 8.0	 7.5	 7.8	 8.6	 9.4	 8.8	 8.7	 9.0	
Government	 0.2	 0.1	 0.3	 0.3	 0.5	 0.3	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	
Other/undefined	 0.3	 0.7	 0.6	 0.7	 1.1	 1.1	 1.3	 1.4	 1.3	 1.2	 0.9	
Blockholders	(aggregate)	 24.1	 26.2	 28.4	 29.5	 28.8	 29.5	 31.8	 35.1	 35.6	 34.6	 34.6	








































4	 The	 shareholders	 with	 stakes	 between	 3%	 and	 5%	 include	 a	 number	 of	 US	 investors	 with	 several	






After	 one	 year	 (2015),	 87%	 of	 the	 blockholdings	 are	 still	 found.	 In	 46%	 of	 the	 2016	
blockholdings	 we	 are	 able	 to	 trace	 the	 firm-shareholder	 relation	 back	 to	 2006,	 i.e.	 after	 10	
years.	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 an	 underestimation,	 because	 some	 firms	 are	 not	 present	 in	 our	










Sum blockholdings Priority shares Certificates Preferred shares 
Below 25% 25% 0% 79% 
26-50% 
 
16% 19% 46% 
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Priority	shares	are	mostly	found	in	firms	with	fewer	blockholdings:	25%	in	the	below	25%	group	
and	only	13%	 in	 the	above	50%	group.	Firms	with	priority	 shares	have	46%	blockholdings	on	
average,	compared	to	51%	of	the	firms	without	priority	shares.	For	certificates	the	result	is	not	
very	clear,	probably	because	 few	firms	are	still	using	certificates.	Preferred	shares	as	an	anti-
takeover	 device	 are	more	 (79%)	 used	 by	 firms	with	 fewer	 blockholdings,	when	 compared	 to	
majority	 blockowned	 firms	 (35%).	 This	 table	 presents	 evidence	 of	 a	 trade-off	 between	 large	
shareholders	and	takeover	defenses.	
Finally,	we	investigate	the	relation	between	blockholders	and	liquidity.	For	the	years	2014-2016	





























This	 chapter	 investigates	 the	 types	 of	 large	 shareholders	 and	 their	 motives	 to	 hold	 large	
shareholdings.	 The	 research	 focuses	 on	 the	 long-term	orientation	 of	 large	 investors.	What	 is	
their	 investment	horizon	and	do	 they	care	about	 long-term	value	creation?	The	behaviour	of	








The	 survey	 is	 conducted	 among	 a	 selected	 set	 of	 large	 shareholders	 (in	 particular	 Dutch	




the	 following	 elements:	 investor	 and	 investment	 characteristics,	 investment	 assessment	 and	
investor	engagement.	The	Monitoring	Committee	has	provided	feedback	on	the	survey.		
Because	 the	 survey	 is	 conducted	 from	a	portfolio	 investment	perspective,	 it	 invites	 the	Chief	
Investment	 Officer	 or	 another	 Board	 Member	 to	 complete	 the	 survey	 (on	 behalf	 of	 the	
company).	 The	 institutional	 investors	 are	 contacted	 via	 Eumedion	 and	 the	 Dutch	 Fund	 and	
Asset	Management	Association	(DUFAS),	whose	members	cover	over	95	percent	of	the	assets	
under	 management	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 Our	 sample	 includes	 financial	 investors	 and	 the	
government,	 but	misses	 the	 category	 of	 persons	 (see	 Tables	 2.1	 and	 2.2).	 26	 responses	 are	
received	 from	116	 invitations	 that	have	been	 sent	 via	 e-mail,	which	 gives	 a	 response	 rate	of	
22.4%.	 This	 response	 rate	 can	 be	 considered	 reasonable	 compared	 to	 similar	 shareholder	
surveys,	 for	 example	 4.3%	 in	 McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	 Starks	 (2016)	 and	 4.6%	 in	 De	 Jong,	
Mertens,	Van	Oosterhout	and	Vletter-van	Dort	(2007).	Although	the	number	of	respondents	is	
not	 high,	 the	 targeted	 approach	 that	 is	 used	 to	 contact	 participants	 has	 resulted	 in	 an	







the	 survey.	 Panel	 A	 shows	 the	 investor	 characteristics.	 Considering	 the	 job	 titles	 of	
respondents,	 it	 can	 be	 safely	 assumed	 that	 the	 people	 completing	 the	 survey	 are	
knowledgeable	 about	 their	 firm’s	 investment	 policies,	 motives	 and	 actions	 as	 large	
shareholders.	A	large	part	of	the	respondents	are	Chief	Investment	Officers	(15%)	and	portfolio	
managers	(35%)	with	primary	responsibility	for	the	firm’s	investment	policy.	This	is	relevant,	as	







between	 the	 asset	 owner	 and	 the	 delegated	 asset	 manager.	 Investment	 objectives,	 risk	







with	 only	 one	 respondent	 from	 the	 United	 States	 and	 one	 from	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	
Nevertheless	-	on	average	-	only	21%	of	the	portfolio	of	the	participating	investors	is	invested	in	
the	 Netherlands.	 The	 limited	 scope	 and	 timeframe	 of	 this	 study	 did	 not	 allow	 an	 extensive	
survey	 among	 foreign	 investors	 in	Dutch	 listed	 companies.	 The	 over-presentation	 of	 pension	
funds	and	under-presentation	of	foreign	investors	(including	hedge	funds)	leads	to	a	selection	
bias,	which	affects	the	results.	As	pension	funds	tend	be	more	long-term	oriented	(reported	in	
our	 results	below),	 the	 survey	 results	may	 reveal	 longer	 time	horizons	 than	a	 survey	with	all	
types	of	 investors	proportionally	 represented.	McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	 Starks	 (2016)	 also	 find	
that	 pension	 funds	 are	 overrepresented	 in	 their	 study,	 arguing	 that	 this	 type	 of	 investors	 is	
more	publicly	oriented	and	is	thus	more	inclined	to	fill	in	surveys	on	this	particular	topic,	while	
hedge	funds	are	under-represented	in	their	study	at	4%.	The	selection	bias	may	also	affect	the	
engagement	 results,	 as	 hedge	 funds,	 which	 are	 not	 participating	 in	 our	 survey,	 are	 activist	
investors,	also	in	the	Netherlands	(Becht,	Franks,	Grant	and	Wagner,	2017).	
The	respondents	 include	very	 large	 investors;	35%	of	 the	sample	 (9	respondents)	have	assets	










Panel	B	of	Table	3.1	 reports	 the	 investor	characteristics.	50%	of	 the	 respondents	have	a	very	
long	holding	period	of	more	than	five	years	and	35%	have	a	long	holding	period	of	more	than	
two	years.	 The	 combined	number	 indicates	 that	85%	of	 respondents	have	a	 long	 investment	
horizon.	 In	 an	 international	 survey	 of	 investors	 based	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Europe,	
McCahery	et	al	(2016)	find	that	71%	have	a	long	holding	period	of	more	than	two	years.	Dutch	
investors	are	thus	found	to	be	more	long-term	oriented	than	their	international	counterparts,	
which	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 stakeholder-oriented	 corporate	 governance	 model	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	The	 investor	horizon	 is	 relevant	as	 long-term	oriented	 investors	are	expected	to	
engage	more	in	long-term	value	creation	and	pursue	shareholder	activities	more	actively.		
Next,	respondents	were	asked	to	indicate	how	important	they	deem	stock	liquidity.	Only	12%	
of	the	respondents	 indicate	that	 it	 is	very	 important,	while	85%	indicates	that	their	 fund	only	
deems	 it	 slightly	/	moderately	 important.	Again	 liquidity	 is	 less	 important	 in	 the	Netherlands.	
McCahery	 et	 al	 (2016)	 find	 that	 35%	 of	 their	 respondents	 deem	 it	 very	 important	 and	 53%	
consider	it	somewhat	important.	Furthermore,	the	respondents	in	our	survey	indicate	that	–	on	
average	 -	 65%	 of	 their	 investments	 is	 invested	 actively	 versus	 passively.	 Larger	 fractions	 of	
investments	are	invested	under	a	concentrated	strategy	and	fundamental	analysis,	rather	than	
under	a	diversified	portfolio	approach.	
Lastly,	 the	 average	 period	 over	 which	 performance	 reviews	 are	 performed	 is	 18	 months.	
Nevertheless,	 this	 result	 is	 quite	 dispersed	 and	 responses	 range	 from	1	month	 (27%)	 and	12	
months	(23%)	to	120	months	(4%).	The	period	over	which	performance	reviews	are	conducted	






Panel A: Investor Characteristics      
   Job-title respondent Observations Percentage 
Chief Investment Officer 4 15 
Board Member 9 35 
Portfolio Manager 9 35 
Corporate Governance or Proxy Voting Specialist 4 15 
Total  26 100 
   Type of Shareholder Observations Percentage 
Pension Fund 8 31 
Pension Fund - Asset Manager 7 27 
Mutual / Investment Fund 7 27 
Bank 0 0 
Hedge Fund 0 0 
Insurance Company 3 11 
Other Financial Institution 1 4 
Total  26 100 
   Assets Under Management Observations Percentage 
Less than €100 million 0 0 
Between €100 million and €1 billion 3 12 
Between  €1 billion and €40 billion 11 42 
Between  €40 billion and €100 billion 3 12 
Between  €100 billion and €400 billion 6 23 
More than €400 billion 3 12 
Total  26 100 
   Country of Headquarters Observations Percentage 
The Netherlands 24 92 
United States 1 4 
United Kingdom  1 4 
Total  26 100 
   Invested in the Netherlands Mean Median 
Fraction of portfolio (in percent) 20.8 4 
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Panel B: Investment Characteristics     
   Holding period of Investments (Horizon) Observations Percentage 
Very short (less than 1 week) 1 4 
Short (less than 6 months) 0 0 
Medium (6 to 12 months) 3 12 
Long (more than 2 years) 9 35 
Very long (more than 5 years) 13 50 
Total  26 100 
   Importance of Stock Liquidity Observations Percentage 
Not at all important 1 4 
Slightly important 9 35 
Moderately important 13 50 
Very important  3 12 
Extremely important 0 0 
Total  26 100 
   Investment strategy Mean Median 
Active 65 78 
Active concentrated 25 10 
Active diversified portfolio 16 0 
Active fundamental analysis  24 5 
Passive  35 23 
Actively monitored 27 20 
Not actively monitored 8 0 
   Period of Perfomance Reviews  Mean Median 




Investor type Total assets (in € billion) Fraction of total assets 
Fraction of survey 
responses 
Insurance Companies € 477 19% 11% 
Investment Funds € 762 31% 31% 
Pension Funds € 1,249 50% 58% 
Source:	Financial	Corporations,	Statistical	Data	Warehouse,	European	Central	Bank.		










different	ways.	 In	 the	 first	 categorisation,	pension	 funds	and	 insurance	 companies	 are	put	 in	
one	group	(hereinafter	‘PFIs’)	and	all	other	blockholders	are	put	in	another	group	(hereinafter	
‘Other	 blockholders’	 or	 ‘OBs’).	 Pension	 funds	 and	 insurance	 companies	 are	 put	 together,	
because	 these	 types	 of	 investors	 have	 long-term	 obligations	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 considerably	
more	prudential	oversight	than	investment	funds.		
This	 initial	 categorisation	 is	 supplemented	with	 two	other	methods	 in	which	 the	 respondents	
are	clustered	into	two	groups.	The	first	method	distinguishes	investors	with	a	(more)	long-term	
horizon	 from	 investors	 with	 a	 more	 short-term	 horizon.	 The	 categorisation	 is	 based	 on	 the	
responses	that	investors	have	provided	on	questions	6	(holding	period),	8	(ideal	horizon)	and	12	
(period	over	which	performance	 reviews	are	 conducted)	of	 the	 survey.	 The	median	 score	on	
these	questions	 is	 calculated:	 investors	who	 score	below	 the	median	are	 in	 the	 “short-term”	




their	 fund.	 Items	 1	 (making	 strong	 financial	 returns)	 and	 3	 (outperforming	 benchmarks)	 are	
indicative	of	a	financial	orientation.	The	score	on	these	financial	 items	relative	to	the	average	
score	 on	 all	 items	 is	 calculated	 for	 each	 respondent.	 Investors	who	 score	 above	 the	median	





To	 question	 25a,	 “does	 your	 institution	 care	 about	 long-term	 value	 creation”,	 100%	 of	 the	
respondents	answered	yes.	Nevertheless,	the	definition	of	long-term	value	creation	may	differ	
per	 respondent	 and	 some	 investors	may	 have	 answered	 this	 question	 in	 a	 politically	 correct	
manner.	 When	 asked	 about	 their	 definition	 of	 long-term	 value	 creation	 (question	 17),	 all	




shows	no	major	 differences	between	 the	 groups.	 The	mean	hovers	 around	3,	 indicating	 that	
investors	 feel	 on	 average	 slightly	 pressurised	 to	 perform	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 On	 “tolerance	
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towards	 temporary	 uncertainty”,	 other	 blockholders	 and	 long-term	 investors	 are	 somewhat	
more	tolerant.	The	sources	of	pressure	are	the	asset	owners	and	beneficiaries	of	the	fund.	This	




 PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Pressure to perform in short-term 
(< 2 y) 3.1 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.9 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Not at all pressured  11 25 15 15 15 15 
Neither pressured nor unpressured  17 13 23 8 15 15 
Slightly pressured 28 25 0 54 15 38 
Pressured 44 38 62 23 54 31 
Extremely pressured 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Mean Mean Mean 
Tolerance towards temporary 
uncertainty  3.4 3.9 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.5 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Very intolerant 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Somewhat intolerant 11 13 15 8 15 8 
Neither tolerant nor intolerant 44 25 46 31 31 46 
Somewhat tolerant 39 25 23 46 38 31 
Very tolerant 6 38 15 15 15 15 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Source of Pressure             
Board of directors 17 20 25 11 22 13 
Asset owners 25 60 38 33 44 25 
Beneficiaries of the fund 33 0 0 44 11 38 
Regulators 8 0 0 11 11 0 
Others 17 20 38 0 11 25 




To	 learn	 about	 performance	metrics,	 an	 open-ended	 question	 (11)	 is	 used.	 Responses	 differ	
among	investors	but	(international)	benchmarks	and	relative	returns	(relative	to	a	benchmark)	
are	 widely	 employed.	 Some	 pension	 fund	 asset	 owners	 indicate	 they	 use	 time-weighted	
returns.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 performance	 of	 pension	 fund	 asset	 managers	 is	 measured	
against	a	benchmark	using	metrics	such	as	tracking	error.	This	 implies	an	 inconsistency	 in	the	
chain	from	asset	owner	to	asset	managers	and	is	likely	to	give	rise	to	principal-agent	frictions.	
Moreover,	 several	 respondents	 include	 ESG	 risks	 in	 their	 performance	 measurement.	 Some	
investment	 funds	 and	 insurers	 use	 absolute	 return	 or	 total	 shareholder	 return.	 A	 venture	
capital	fund	indicates	to	look	at	revenue	and	EBITDA	growth.	
In	 order	 to	 gain	 further	 insights	 in	 long-term	 value	 orientation,	 respondents	 are	 asked	 to	
indicate	 how	 important	 several	 goals	 are	 for	 their	 fund.	 Table	 3.4	 presents	 the	 survey	
outcomes,	 together	 with	 a	 statistical	 test	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 mean	 score	 of	 groups	 are	
significantly	 different5.	 The	 highest	 goal	 scoring	 for	 all	 groups	 is	 “making	 strong	 financial	
returns”.	This	makes	sense,	as	all	respondents	work	for	financial	institutions	and	their	primary	
goal	 is	generating	 returns	 for	beneficiaries	by	 investing	 their	money.	All	 groups	 regard	“good	
governance”	as	an	 important	goal.	 It	 is	notable	 that	other	blockholders,	 short-term	 investors	
and	 financially	 oriented	 investors	 rate	 “outperforming	 benchmarks”	 as	 significantly	 more	
important	 than	the	pension	 funds	and	 insurers,	 long-term	 investors	and	stakeholder	oriented	
investors.	 This	 could	 be	 a	 sign	 these	 investor	 groups	 are	 less	 long-term	 oriented	 and	 could	
cautiously	be	interpreted	as	evidence	for	the	fact	that	“benchmark	thinking”	is	more	prevalent	
within	 these	 groups	 of	 investors.	 Next,	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 as	 well	 as	 stakeholder	
oriented	investors	rate	social	and	environmental	impact	as	significantly	more	important.	
On	the	composite	scales	for	long-term	and	short-term	goals,	again	pension	funds	and	insurers	
and	 stakeholder	 oriented	 investors	 show	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 long-term	 value	 creation,	









  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Importance of goals              
1. Making strong financial returns 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.9* 4.5* 
2. Environmental impact 3.9** 3.1** 3.7 3.7 3.2*** 4.2*** 
3. Outperforming benchmarks 3.4* 4.3* 3.9 3.4 4.4*** 2.9*** 
4. Social (e.g. human rights) 4.1* 3.3* 3.8 3.8 3.4** 4.2** 
5. Play a stewardship role  3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.1** 4.0** 
6. Employee interests 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.5 
7. Good governance 4.1 3.9 4.2* 3.8* 3.9 4.2 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Mean Mean Mean 
Composite scales             
Long-term value creation goals 
(max = 20) 15.5* 13.4* 14.9 14.8 13.7** 16.0** 
Short-term oriented goals 
(max = 10) 8.0** 9.1** 8.7 7.9 9.2*** 7.4*** 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Does your fund reject ESG risks             
Yes 89.0 87.5 100.0* 76.9* 84.6 92.3 
No 11.0 12.5 0.0 23.1 15.4 7.7 





investor	 groups	 are	 motivated	 by	 their	 primary	 beneficiaries	 to	 pursue	 long-term	 value	
creation.	Pension	funds	and	insurers	“base	their	decisions	on	a	thorough	cost-benefit	analysis”	
and	are	“inspired	by	their	professional	networks”.	Stakeholder	oriented	investors	“feel	it	is	their	
obligation	 to	society”	and	“invest	 significant	 resources	 in	measuring	 the	benefits	of	 long-term	







  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
		 Mean Mean Mean 
Motives to engage in LTVC             
(1) Decisions are based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis 4.1** 3.1** 3.6 3.9 3.5 4.1 
(2) We know that LTVC has a postive impact with shareholder returns 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 
(3) Our activieties to pursue LTVC are influenced by other institutional investors 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.6 
(4) Our primary beneficiaries want us to pursue LTVC 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.3 
(5) We invest significant resources in measuring the benefits of LTVC 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.8* 3.5* 
(6) The new Corporate Governance code or NGOs prompt us to pursue LTVC 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 
(7) Pursuing LTVC is our insurance against uncertainty  3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6** 3.9** 
(8) We assume but have no proof that LTVC has a postive impact on sh. returns 3.0 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.0 
(9) We feel pressure from our stakeholders to pursue LTVC 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.5 
(10) We feel it is our obligation to society to pursue LTVC 4.0 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.4* 4.2* 
(11) Professional networks inspire us to pursue LTVC 3.3* 2.4* 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.1 


















  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
		 Mean Mean Mean 
We tend to become more active…             
…with companies that are experiencing corporate governance issues 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.3 
…when we hold a larger % of total outstanding voting rights of the target 3.3 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.2 
…when we know that other investors are also active in the target company 2.9 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.1 
…when the level of insider ownership in the target is higher 2.7 2.9 2.4** 3.1** 2.8 2.8 
…when the level of institutional ownership in the target is higher 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 
…when our investment in the target is relatively large to our total investments 3.4 3.9 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.5 
…on the shares of companies we know well 3.2 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.4 
…on the shares of companies with whom we do not have close business ties 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.9 2.5 2.7 
…with companies that are underperforming 3.6* 4.4* 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 




3.7	 indicates	 again	 that	 “inadequate	 corporate	 governance”	 emerges	 as	 the	most	 important	
trigger	 for	 all	 investor	 groups.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	 of	McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	
Starks	(2016).	The	other	triggers	differ	across	the	groups.	“Corporate	fraud”	and	“management	
compensation”	are	important	triggers	for	pension	funds	and	insurers	and	stakeholder-oriented	
investors.	 For	 other	 blockholders,	 “poor	 corporate	 strategy”	 is	 an	 important	 trigger.	 Finally,	
“Socially	 irresponsible	corporate	behaviour	(e.g.	pollution)”	 is	an	important	trigger	for	pension	
funds	 and	 insurers,	 long-term	 and	 stakeholder	 oriented	 investors,	 indicating	 that	 these	
investors	groups	rate	social	and	environmental	factors	more	than	their	respective	counterpart	
groups.	
So,	 Table	 3.6	 is	 about	 the	 selection	 of	 companies	 that	 are	 targeted	 and	 Table	 3.7	 about	 the	






  PFIs OBs ST LT FIN STH 
		 % of top 4 % of top 4 % of top 4 
Triggers for Shareholder Engagement       
Poor absolute financial performance 11 38 15 23 31 8 
Poor corporate strategy 28 63 31 46 46 31 
Excessive management compensation 67 0 54 38 31 62 
Earnings restatement 17 0 23 0 0 23 
Large negative earnings surprise 11 0 0 15 8 8 
Low payments to shareholders despite high cash holdings 6 0 0 8 8 0 
Inadequate corporate governance 83 63 69 85 77 77 
Uncooperative management 0 25 8 8 8 8 
Poor financial performance relative to peers 28 38 31 31 38 23 
Large equity issuance 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Large diversifying merger or acquisition 17 38 15 31 15 31 
Suboptimal capital structure 6 38 23 8 23 8 
The threat of major shareholders to sell shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corporate fraud 56 13 46 38 31** 54** 
Socially "irresponsible" corporate behaviour (e.g. pollution) 67 25 46 62 38 69 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 	 	 	 	 	 	





indicate	 they	 use	 a	 combination	 of	 strategies,	 we	 construct	 a	 composite	 variable	 for	
engagement	 (based	 on	 a	 full	 weight	 on	 the	 engagement	 variable	 and	 a	 half	 weight	 on	 the	
combined	variable).	It	appears	that	engagement	is	by	far	the	preferred	strategy	for	all	investor	
groups,	 with	 a	 slightly	 higher	 score	 for	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers,	 long-term	 investors	 and	
stakeholder	 oriented	 investors.	 These	 latter	 groups	 have	 a	 slight	 preference	 for	 “inclusion”,	
while	 their	 counterparts	 (investment	 funds,	 short-term	 investors	 and	 financial	 oriented	
investors)	have	a	 slight	preference	 for	a	“best	 in	class	approach”.	About	half	of	 the	 investors	
belief	that	the	threat	of	exit	is	effective.		
Most	 investors	 belief	 that	 a	minimum	 stake	 in	 the	 company	of	 2%	 is	 needed	 to	 be	 effective	
(bottom	panel	of	Table	3.8).	That	is	line	with	a	recent	report	on	the	investment	strategy	of	the	
Norwegian	Government	Pension	Fund	 (Kapoor,	2017).	 The	Norwegian	Fund	 follows	a	passive	
benchmark	strategy	with	a	maximum	allowable	tracking	error	of	1%,	investing	in	close	to	9,000	
companies.	 Kapoor	 (2017)	 observes	 that	 the	 Norwegian	 Fund	 does	 not	 know	 enough	 about	
what	the	companies	it	invests	in	get	up	to.	Moreover,	the	average	stake	is	1.3%	of	companies	
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  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
		 % % % 
Preferred Strategy              
Exclusion 11 0 8 8 8 8 
Inclusion  6 0 0 8 0 8 
Engagement 44 50 31 62 46 46 
Confrontation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Best-in-class approach 0 13 0 8 8 0 
Combination of the above strategies 39 25 54 15 31 38 
None of the above  0 13 8 0 8 0 
              
Composite engagement 64 63 58 69 62 65 
              
Threat of Exit Effective             
Yes 50 38 54 38 38 54 
No 50 63 46 62 62 46 
              
Minimum stake size to be effective             
Doesn't matter 44 0 68 0 25 43 
At least 0.5% 11 0 0 20 0 14 
At least 2% 33 100 17 80 75 29 
At least 5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
At least 10% 11 0 17 0 0 14 
		             




The	 results	 for	prevalence	of	 several	 voice	 and	exit	 channels	 are	 contained	 in	 Table	3.9.	 The	





to	 management”	 (62%)	 are	 the	 most	 important	 engagement	 channels.	 These	 channels	 are	
consistent	 with	 the	 results	 of	 McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	 Starks	 (2016).	 Next,	 “selling	 shares	
because	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 performance”	 (58%)	 and	 “selling	 shares	 because	 of	
dissatisfaction	with	social	or	environmental	practices”	 (54%)	are	 important	exit	 channels.	The	
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use	 of	 the	 engagement	 channel	 “discussions	 with	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors6	 outside	 of	
management”	(54%)	is	consistent	with	the	finding	by	McCahery,	Sautner	and	Starks	(2016)	that	
investors	first	try	to	engage	with	firms	behind	the	scenes	and	only	take	public	measures	if	these	
private	 discussions	 fail.	 It	 also	 explains	 why	 “publicly	 criticising	 management	 in	 the	 media”	
ranks	so	low.		
Hedge	 funds,	which	are	not	 included	 in	our	survey,	are	 important	activist	 investors,	engaging	




a	 more	 recent	 international	 survey	 (including	 the	 Netherlands)	 from	 2000	 till	 2010,	 Becht,	
Franks,	Grant	and	Wagner	(2017)	find	that	almost	one-quarter	of	hedge	fund	engagements	are	









   
1 None 4% 
2 Selling shares because of dissatisfaction with performance 58% 
3 Selling shares because of dissatisfaction with corporate governance practices 50% 
4 Voting against management at the annual meeting (AGM) 73% 
5 Selling shares because of dissatisfaction with social or environmental practices 54% 
6 Publicly criticising management in the media 19% 
7 Legal action against management (e.g. file a lawsuit, participate in a class action) 35% 
8 Submitting shareholder proposals for the proxy statement 31% 
9 Discussions with members of the Board of Directors outside of management 54% 
10 Discussions with top management 73% 
11 Criticizing management and the board at the annual meeting (AGM) 35% 
12 Publicising a dissenting vote 27% 
13 Writing a letter to management 62% 
14 Aggressively questioning management in a conference call 15% 
15 Proposing specific actions to management (e.g. sell assets, fire the CEO) 46% 
16 Other 19% 
   







make	 use	 of	 an	 external	 proxy	 advisor	 before	 the	 Annual	 General	 Meeting	 of	 shareholders	
(AGM).	 Investors	 use	 the	 proxy	 advice	 to	 determine	 their	 own	 position.	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	
McCahery,	Sautner	and	Starks	 (2016),	who	find	that	 investors	report	 that	proxy	advisors	help	






Use of external proxy advisor before AGM  
Always 42 
That depends on the company 12 
That depends on the agenda item 8 
That depends on the circumstances 8 
Never 31 
  Extent to which advice is fully used  
Follow advice fully 6 
Take into account to determine own position 90 
Take into account in case of doubts 0 
Other 6 
  





	  Shares held back to short-sell  
Fraction of shares (%) 2.4 
  
Total observations 26 
Note:	The	percentages	add	vertically	up	to	100%.	
	
Next,	 the	 survey	 examines	 legal	 arrangements	 or	 take-over	 defenses.	 Table	 3.11	 report	 that	
pyramid	 structures	 and	 dual-class	 shares	 are	 prohibitive;	 a	 majority	 of	 investors	 would	 not	
invest	in	companies	with	this	type	of	legal	arrangement.	Priority	shares	and	loyalty	voting	rights	





  We would not invest We are indifferent More likely to invest 
        
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Legal Arrangements       
Binding nomination 16 84 0 
Anti-takeover preferred shares 24 72 4 
Certificates 24 72 4 
Priority shares 36 64 0 
Loyalty voting rights 36 64 0 
Pyramid structure 52 48 0 
Dual-class shares 44 56 0 
        






quantitative	data	provided	by	 the	 survey.	The	 survey	 identifies	motives,	engagement	 triggers	
and	methods	 in	 a	 structured	 way,	 whereas	 the	 interviews	 are	 used	 to	 provide	 some	 of	 the	
detail	 and	 the	 narrative	 of	 how	 concepts	 are	 applied	 and	 what	 potential	 bottlenecks	 and	
dilemmas	 investors	 face	 in	 the	process	of	adopting	a	 long-term	perspective.	 Long-term	value	
creation	 can	 still	 be	 considered	 a	 relatively	 qualitative	 concept	 requiring	 qualitative	
performance	measures	 (Barton	&	Wiseman,	2014).	The	 format	 is	a	 semi-structured	 interview	
and	participants	are	provided	with	a	topic	guide	that	includes	six	themes	that	define	the	area	
that	 will	 be	 exploited	 (long-term	 value	 creation).	 For	 each	 of	 the	 themes	 a	 concept	 map	 is	
developed	depicting	the	most	important	concepts	that	emerged	during	the	interviews.	
The	 interviews	 took	 place	 in	 July	 and	August	 2017.	 The	 aim	of	 the	 selection	 procedure	 is	 to	
select	 the	most	knowledgeable	 informants	 from	a	diverse	variety	of	 institutional	 investors.	 In	
total	ten	large	shareholders	of	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies	participated	in	the	interviews,	




On	 the	 definition	 of	 long-term	 value	 creation,	 all	 investors	 indicate	 that	 a	 high	 and	 stable	
financial	return	is	their	most	important	goal.	Second,	a	remark	that	recurred	during	a	majority	





want	 to	contribute	to	 financial	stability	and	add	value	to	the	real	economy,	which	 is	done	by	
taking	 into	 account	 more	 than	 only	 financial	 factors.	 A	 very	 important	 concept	 here	 is	





capable	 of	 managing	 their	 risks	 and	 therefore	 considered	 to	 be	 more	 attractive	 investment	
opportunities.		




investor,	 you	are	 only	 as	 good	as	 your	 last	 year’s	 performance”.	 	 This	 investor	 indicates	 that	
clients	 exert	 pressure	 on	 them	 to	 perform	well	 in	 the	 short-term.	 This	 subsequently	 induces	




distinction	 is	 important.	 Looking	 across	 all	 interviews,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
long-term	goals	are	really	pursued	by	an	investor	depends	on	the	business	model,	investment	
belief	and	the	mandate	the	investor	has	been	given	by	asset	owners/clients.	Most	funds	argue	
it	 is	 easier	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	 creation	 for	 concentrated	portfolios	 rather	 than	 (large)	
diversified	 portfolios.	 Family	 offices	 and	 smaller	 investment	 funds	 indicate	 that	 their	
concentrated	 portfolio	 enables	 them	 to	 engage	 in	 constant	 dialogues	 with	 a	 selected	 set	 of	
companies.	 They	 are	 able	 to	 compensate	 their	 “lack”	 of	 diversification	 with	 exceptional	
knowledge	about	the	firms	they	are	invested	in.		
Lastly,	one	 large	 investment	 fund	and	one	 large	pension	 fund	asset	manager	argued	that	not	
only	 active	 investments	 are	 geared	 towards	 the	 long-term.	 They	 provide	 the	 contrarian	
argument,	pleading	that	passive	investments	are	by	definition	long-term:	“as	a	passive	investor,	
you	cannot	sell.	You	are	invested	in	companies	as	long	as	they	constitute	the	index	and	for	large	








One	 can	 distinguish	 between	 two	 broad	 types	 of	 investment	 strategies.	 The	 more	 passive	
investment	strategies	that	are	tracking	an	index	use	metrics,	such	as	tracking	error,	information	
ratio	and	Sharpe	ratio.	Funds	with	clients	who	have	longer-term	obligations	indicate	that	their	
clients	 (asset	 owners)	 assess	 their	 fund’s	 performance	 based	 on	 longer-term	 (i.e.	 five-year)	
returns.	 Even	 though	 this	 is	 a	 considerably	 lengthy	 period,	 the	 fact	 that	 investors	 follow	 a	
benchmark	indicates	they	are	not	consciously	selecting	companies	for	which	they	believe	that	
they	will	add	value	over	the	 long	run.	One	 large	pension	fund	(asset	manager)	 indicates	that,	
depending	 on	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	 asset	 owner,	 it	 does	 sometimes	 have	 some	 flexibility	 to	
adjust	benchmarks	and	add	ESG	factors	for	example.	
Most	investors	believe	transparency	and	disclosure	from	portfolio	companies	is	very	important.	
When	 considering	 the	 period	 of	 performance	 reviews,	 one	 large	 passive	 investment	 fund	
indicates	that:	“we	are	not	saying	that	quarterly	reporting	is	completely	wrong	by	definition.	We	
just	think	that	the	language	around	it	needs	to	be	changed:	more	forward-looking	in	relation	to	
the	 long-term	 strategy,	 rather	 than	 observed	 in	 vacuum”.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 large	 active	
investment	 funds	has	 an	opposite	 view	 saying:	“because	we	as	an	 investor	have	a	 long-term	
horizon,	performance	also	needs	to	be	assessed	on	the	long-term”.	This	fund	also	includes	the	





fundamental	 metrics	 beyond	 a	 three/five	 year	 horizon,	 one	 insurance	 company	 indicates	 it	
does	 a	 valuation	 and	 then	places	 this	 value	within	 the	 context	of	 longer	 term	 trends	 for	 the	
company	/	sector	/	market	and	subsequently	applies	a	discount	or	a	premium.	
All	 investors	 highly	 value	 trust	 and	 capable	 (reliable)	management,	 even	 though	 this	 point	 is	
most	 strongly	 emphasized	 by	 the	 more	 concentrated	 investment	 funds	 (for	 example	 Family	
Offices).	 Having	 a	 concentrated	 portfolio	 enables	 these	 investors	 to	 engage	 in	 constant	
dialogues	with	management.		
Interestingly,	 the	more	active	portfolios	seem	to	have	a	more	 flexible	mandate.	They	are	not	
“punished”	 by	 their	 asset	 owners	 for	 (temporary)	 deviations	 from	 benchmarks	 and	 their	
performance	 is	 neither	 judged	 on	 absolute,	 nor	 relative	 returns.	 They	 look	 past	 (short-term)	
swings	in	the	stock	price,	but	more	at	the	intrinsic	value	of	the	company.	Nevertheless,	when	
looking	 over	 the	 long-term,	 all	 these	 active	 investors	 indicated	 they	 have	 outperformed	
benchmarks	 significantly.	 They	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 a	 proven	 investment	 philosophy	 that	works.	
The	 tension	 that	 is	 created	 by	 benchmarks	 is	 also	 highlighted	 by	 large	 pension	 fund	 asset	




merely	 use	 them	 as	 a	 “reference	 index”.	 One	 investment	 fund	 even	 calls	 active	 investments	





also	 create	more	 financial	 value	 in	 the	 long-run:	 “For	 us,	 ESG	 is	 not	 a	 tick-the-box	 element”.	
Most	investors	use	self-developed	ESG	indicators	whereas	some	others	rely	on	scores	from,	for	





want	 to	make	sure	 that	 the	asset	side	 is	also	capable	of	creating	value	on	a	 long	horizon.	All	
investors	mention	the	instrumental	motives:	they	invest	in	order	to	generate	returns	and	they	
believe	that	investing	in	sustainable	companies	with	a	solid	business	model	will	enable	them	to	









practice	 without	 repeatedly	 being	 questioned.	 One	 of	 the	 interviewees	 indicates:	 “It	 is	 our	
responsibility	to	be	stewards	of	capital”.		
Another	 key	 driver	 to	 invest	 in	 long-term	 value	 creation	 is	 client	 demand	 (or	 the	 wishes/	
mandates	of	 asset	 owners).	 Investing	 is	 effectively	 a	 service	business	 and	 client	 demand	 is	 a	
very	 important	 consideration	 when	 deciding	 on	 the	 strategy	 that	 will	 be	 pursued.	 Hence,	
fiduciary	duty	 is	a	key	concept.	 Interestingly,	 international	 interviewees	 indicate	that	they	are	










Engagement	 consists	 of	 a	 number	 of	 subsequent	 steps,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 that	 the	 exact	
methods	differ	 across	 investor	 types.	 The	 frequency	 and	how	 the	methods	 are	 employed	do	
differ.	Most	investors	indicate	to	actively	pursue	SRI	(sustainable,	responsible	impact	investing)	
engagement.	One	widely	used	mechanism	is	exclusion.	Thus,	excluded	companies	are	already	in	
advance	 not	 considered	 for	 investments	 (e.g.	 tobacco	 industry).	 One	 pension	 fund	 (asset	
manager)	 did	 indicate	 that	 extending	 the	 list	 of	 “excluded	 companies”	 does	 mean	 that	
portfolios	deviate	from	benchmarks	more,	and	this	is	not	something	that	all	portfolio	managers	
are	 equally	 excited	 about.	 Most	 investors	 also	 use	 (positive)	 screening.	 For	 example,	 when	




primarily	driven	by	 the	more	active	holdings,	 as	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	engage	 in	a	dialogue	with	




not	 seen	 as	 the	 most	 interesting	 moment	 for	 engagement.	 More	 important	 is	 the	 period	
running	 up	 to	 the	AGM.	Only	 few	 investors	 have	 indicated	 that	 they	 have	 recently	 used	 the	
media	 to	publicly	communicate	 their	viewpoint	on	a	certain	matter.	Media	attention	 is	often	
not	considered	as	supportive	of	long-term	goals.		
For	most	 large	 funds,	 the	corporate	governance	specialists	decide	on	 the	engagement	policy,	
whereas	 the	 portfolio	 managers	 take	 the	 investment	 decisions	 and	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
actual	engagement.	This	can	 lead	to	situations	 in	which	no	 integrated	decisions	are	made.	All	
investors	 indicate	 they	 make	 use	 of	 collective	 engagement	 (with	 other	 investors),	 as	 they	
believe	this	enables	them	to	have	a	stronger	voice.	Of	critical	 importance	here	are	regulatory	
considerations	 (e.g.	 acting	 in	 concert	 rules)	 and	 finding	 investors	 that	 are	 like-minded.	
Collective	engagement	and	collaboration	only	work	if	investors	have	similar	investment	beliefs.	
All	investors	indicate	that	they	make	extensive	use	of	Eumedion	(and	equivalent	bodies	in	other	
countries)	 to	 communicate	with	 other	 investors.	 These	 dialogues	 stimulate	 relationships	 and	
trust	 among	 investors.	 Engagement	with	 Dutch	 companies	 is	 considered	 as	 very	 pleasant	 by	
most	investors,	due	to	the	proximity	of	management	and	good	governance	practices.	
On	 the	 concept	 of	 exit,	 a	 distinction	 is	 made	 between	 active	 investments	 and	 passive	
investments	that	follow	a	benchmark.	For	active	investments,	most	investors	will	only	exit	after	
an	extensive	period	of	 engagement	 (if	 they	believe	 in	 the	 company).	 Sometimes,	 if	 investors	
deem	 a	 business	 model	 to	 be	 “broken”,	 they	 will	 exit	 earlier.	 More	 commercial	 investment	
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funds	 are	 more	 inclined	 to	 exit	 if	 companies	 are	 underperforming	 (i.e.	 their	 share	 is	
underperforming)	 but	 for	 all	 investors	 holds	 that	 “trust”	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 of	 critical	
importance.	 Threat	 of	 exit	 is	 not	 something	 investors	 use	 explicitly,	 especially	 not	 publicly:	
often	companies	are	already	aware	of	the	situation	as	constructive	conversations	take	place	in	
an	earlier	stage.	Multiple	interviewees	referred	to	the	“carrot	and	stick”	idiom,	indicating	they	
try	 to	 use	 the	 carrot	 more	 than	 the	 stick.	 But	 if	 things	 are	 really	 not	 working	 out,	 exit	 is	
inevitable.	Not	following	through	would	undermine	investors’	credibility.		
Family	 offices	 have	 smaller,	more	 concentrated	 portfolios	 and	 large	 stakes	 in	 the	 companies	
they	 invest	 in.	 They	 see	 themselves	 as	 cooperative	 and	 constructive	 shareholders,	 having	
dialogues	with	 companies	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 These	 funds	 explicitly	 indicate	 to	 prefer	 engaging	
behind	 the	 scenes.	 Interestingly,	 family	offices	 indicate	 they	do	not	 feel	“exit	pressure”:	 they	
can	 remain	 invested	 in	 companies	 they	 believe	 in,	 even	 if	 these	 companies	 are	 temporarily	
underperforming	or	suffering	from	a	crisis.	Often	these	funds	have	a	turn-over	of	only	one	or	
two	 companies	 a	 year.	 This	 is	 possible	 because	 the	 fund’s	 performance	 is	 not	 related	 to	 an	
annual	benchmark:	 the	structure	and	 investment	strategy	of	 these	 funds	enables	 them	to	be	
true	long-term	investors.	This	approach	is	more	suitable	for	small	to	medium	size	enterprises.	









On	 external	 barriers,	 an	 often	 mentioned	 barrier	 is	 prudential	 supervision	 and	 (legal)	
restrictions	 placed	 upon	 investors	 by	 regulators.	 The	 Dutch	 prudential	 supervisor	 (DNB)	
requires	 large	 institutional	 investors	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 certain	 risk	 profile,	 diversification	
requirements	and	 financial	 risk	management	metrics.	As	argued	by	one	 the	 respondents,	 the	
Dutch	 supervisor	 even	 explicitly	 penalises	 pension	 funds	 for	 using	 active	management,	 with	
higher	 solvency	 requirements	 in	 its	new	FTK	 regulatory	 framework.	An	exception	 is	made	 for	
equity	 portfolios	 that	 have	 a	 tracking	 error	 of	 less	 than	 1%.	 Insurance	 companies	 explicitly	
mention	 Solvency	 II.	 These	 constraints	 in	 turn	 pressure	 investors	 into	 generating	 short-term	
returns,	rather	than	focusing	on	long-term	investments.	It	is	known	that	the	use	of	short-term	
benchmarks	 enhances	 short-termism,	 but	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurance	 companies	 are	 not	
allowed	to	simply	choose	another	(non-standard)	benchmark.	One	must	not	only	be	willing	but	
also	 able	 to	 be	 patient	 and	 accept	 (temporary)	 set-backs	 in	 stock	 performance	 of	 portfolio	








management	 can	 take	 deliberate	 decisions	 in	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 all	 stakeholders.	
Nevertheless,	 not	 all	 investors	 are	 equally	 happy	 about	 these	 developments.	 During	 the	
interviews,	some	investors	(both	Dutch	and	foreign)	have	indicated	their	concerns,	as	they	are	
afraid	that	 the	 introduction	of	new	 legislation	might	 lead	to	an	erosion	of	shareholder	rights.	
During	cooling-off	periods	for	example,	shareholders	might	be	blocked	from	engagement.	This	
would	 even	 hold	 for	 very	 long-term	 shareholders	 that	 have	 been	 with	 the	 company	 for	
decades.	One	interviewee	said:	“Effectively,	we	cannot	do	our	job	if	we	don’t	have	the	tools	to	





that	enables	 them	 to	do	 that.	All	 companies	use	different	methods	 to	 report	ESG	 factors	 for	
example.	A	more	standardised	approach	would	be	beneficial.		
Investors	also	need	to	take	the	mandate	of	their	asset	owners	and	the	wishes	of	their	clients	
into	careful	consideration.	This	 is	the	most	 important	determinant	of	the	 investment	strategy	
that	 is	 pursued.	 Asset	 owners	 may	 judge	 an	 investors’	 performance	 based	 on	 a	 short-term	
benchmark	 or	 put	 more	 emphasis	 on	 strong	 financial	 rather	 than	 socially	 responsible	
performance.	 Investors	need	 to	adhere	 to	 these	wishes.	Thus,	 key	here	 is	 that	 the	 triangular	
interests	between	asset	owner,	asset	manager	and	company	are	aligned.	Therefore,	in	order	to	
truly	maintain	 a	 long-term	 focus,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 all	 three	actors	 to	have	 long-term	goals.	
According	to	one	insurance	company:	“we	are	evaluated	by	our	clients.	Asset	managers	cannot	
move	 without	 asset	 owners	 moving	 preferably	 beforehand	 or	 at	 least	 at	 the	 same	 time”.	
Another	clear	example	of	this	is	family	offices:	they	indicate	that	they	do	not	experience	any	of	
these	barriers	 as	 they	deal	with	 less	 regulatory	 issues	 and	have	 a	 very	 flexible	mandate.	 For	
them,	the	chain	from	asset	owner	to	asset	manager	is	short	and	works	efficiently.		
The	 last	 external	 barrier	 is	 the	monthly	 performance	 rankings	 between	 investors.	 The	media	
compares	investment	funds	with	each	other	on	one,	three	and	six	months	intervals	and	makes	
all	sorts	of	rankings.	This	is	not	supportive	of	a	long-term	focus	but	gives	rise	to	short-termism.	
Looking	at	more	 internal	barriers,	an	 important	one	 is	 compensation.	Out-performance	often	








Another	barrier	 is	 that	 actively	 investing	 in	 and	engaging	with	 companies	 also	 requires	more	
feet	 on	 the	 ground	 and	 inevitably	 costs	more	 time	 and	money.	 Lastly,	many	 asset	managers	
have	 been	 educated	 classically	 and	most	 professionals	 have	 been	 conditioned	 into	 a	 certain	
way	of	thinking.	Our	brains	are	“wired”	towards	the	short-term.	Therefore	a	fund’s	investment	






A	 paradigm	 shift	 is	 needed	 and	 this	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 differently	 educating	 new	
(finance)	professionals.	Not	only	the	universities	but	also	the	CFA	program	are	important	in	this.	
Sustainable	finance	must	not	be	viewed	as	a	separate	branch,	but	as	an	integral	part	of	finance.	
Next,	 incentives	need	 to	be	aligned.	Not	only	 internally	 towards	asset	managers	by	adjusting	
their	compensation	structure,	but	also	externally	between	all	the	players	in	the	complex	social	
system.	Important	here	are	companies,	which	need	to	work	on	their	disclosure,	and	regulators	












In	 the	survey,	all	 investors	answer	 that	 they	care	about	 long-term	value	creation.	 In	practice,	
the	interviewed	investors	indicate	they	consider	financial	motives	as	being	the	most	important	




term	 focus.	 Nevertheless,	 what	 distinguishes	 truly	 long-term	 oriented	 investors	 from	 other	
investors	 is	 the	emphasis	 they	put	on	other	 stakeholders	 (the	wider	 stakeholder	model;	 also	
taking	 into	 account	 social	 and	 environmental	 factors	 for	 example).	Many	 investors	 explicitly	
mention	 stakeholders	 when	 they	 are	 asked	 to	 provide	 their	 definition	 of	 long-term	 value	
creation.	 In	 the	 survey,	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 score	 these	 factors	 higher.	 Also,	 in	 the	





term	 value	 creation.	 It	 also	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 having	 aligned	 triangular	 interests	
between	 asset	 owners,	 asset	 managers	 and	 companies	 in	 order	 to	 escape	 from	 “short-
termism”.		
Lastly,	 another	 result	 from	 the	 survey	 that	 is	 emphasised	 in	 the	 interviews	 is	 that	 investors	
prefer	behind	the	scenes	(private)	engagement	over	public	engagement.	Trust	and	cooperation	
with	management	are	found	to	be	very	important,	and	this	has	increased	in	the	last	couple	of	





Ideally,	 this	 study	would	 include	the	voting	behaviour	of	 large	shareholders	of	Dutch	 firms	at	
the	shareholder	meetings.	In	the	US,	institutional	investors	are	required	to	disclose	their	voting	
for	each	 firm	and	per	agenda	 item.	Also	 in	 the	Dutch	 setting	 this	 information	 is	 available	 for	
large	institutional	investors.	We	have	contacted	ISS,	the	largest	data	warehouse	on	voting,	but	
they	could	not	provide	voting	data	for	blockolders	in	Dutch	firms	to	us.	Although	we	have	been	
able	 to	 find	 evidence	 of	 Dutch	 shareholders	 disclosing	 information	 about	 voting,	 this	 only	

















earlier.	There	 is	a	 trade-off	between	ownership	concentration	on	 the	one	hand	and	 takeover	
defenses	and	liquidty	on	the	other	hand:	firms	with	blockholders	are	less	protected	by	takeover	
defenses	and	have	lower	liquidity.	
The	 development	 over	 the	 past	 decade	 is	 interesting,	 because	 concentrated	 shareholdings	
facilitate	 a	 long-term	 orientation	 (see	 section	 4.3).	 Blockholders	 have	 the	 voting	 power	 to	
influence	firms,	while	reduced	liquidity	makes	voting	with	the	feet	expensive.	The	development	
for	Dutch	firms	where	ownership	concentration	is	reduced	thus	affects	the	potential	for	 long-
term	 oriented	 shareholders	 negatively.	 Simultaneously,	 shareholdings	 in	 Dutch	 corporations	






least	 two	years	and	half	of	 the	 investors	 indicate	 that	 they	have	a	horizon	of	more	 than	 five	
years.	 Pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 find	 long-term	 oriented	 goals	 more	 important	 than	
investment	funds.	While	all	investor	groups	consider	financial	returns	to	be	important	for	long-
term	 value	 creation,	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 rank	 social	 and	 environmental	 factors	
significantly	higher	than	investment	funds.	
Most	 investors	 argue	 that	 long-term	 value	 creation	 can	 only	 be	 realised	 by	 investing	 in	 and	
engaging	with	companies	that	are	capable	of	adding	value	over	the	long-term,	thereby	having	a	






owners	 or	 clients)	 to	 pursue	 long-term	 value	 creation.	 Another	 important	 motive	 is	 the	
investment	belief	 that	 long-term	value	creation	has	a	positive	 impact	on	shareholder	returns.	
Stakeholder	 oriented	 investors	 feel	 it	 is	 their	 obligation	 to	 society	 and	 invest	 significant	
resources	in	measuring	the	benefits	of	long-term	value	creation.	
It	 is	 easier	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	 creation	 for	 concentrated	portfolios	 rather	 than	 (large)	
diversified	portfolios.	Moreover,	a	 long	 investment	chain	complicates	alignment	on	 long-term	







managers	 are	 sometimes	 based	 on	minimising	 the	 tracking	 error	with	 a	 leading	 benchmark,	
while	 pension	 fund	 owners	 themselves	 use	 a	 time	weighted	 return.	 Respondents’	 indication	
that	 they	 pursue	 long-term	 value	 creation	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 wide-	 spread	 practice	 of	
measuring	performance	against	a	market	return	benchmark.		
Another	 barrier	 is	 the	 traditional	 education	 of	 portfolio	 managers	 with	 a	 strong	 belief	 in	
markets,	 which	 can	 foster	 short-termism.	 Next,	 prudential	 supervision	 requires	 large	
institutional	 investors	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 certain	 risk	 profile,	 diversification	 requirements	 and	
financial	 risk	 management	 metrics	 and	 questions	 investors	 when	 there	 are	 deviations	 from	
benchmarks.	




Inadequate	 corporate	 governance	 is	 an	 important	 trigger	 for	 shareholder	 engagement	 for	 all	
investor	 groups.	 For	 investment	 funds,	 the	 most	 important	 trigger	 to	 become	 active	 is	
underperformance	of	a	company.	 In	contrast,	 socially	 irresponsible	corporate	behaviour	 is	an	
important	trigger	for	pension	funds	and	insurers	and	stakeholder	oriented	investors.	
Engagement	 is	 the	 preferred	 strategy	 for	 all	 investor	 groups.	 Most	 investors	 indicate	 that	




whereas	 the	 portfolio	 managers	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 investment	 decisions	 and	 actual	
engagement.	This	can	lead	to	situations	in	which	no	integrated	decisions	are	made.	
All	 investors	 indicate	 they	make	use	of	 collective	engagement	 (with	other	 investors),	 as	 they	
believe	this	enables	them	to	have	a	stronger	voice.	Of	critical	 importance	here	are	regulatory	






The	 blockholder	 data	 obtained	 from	WFT	 notifications	 offers	 a	 reasonable	 overview	 of	 the	
shares	of	5%	and	above	and	since	2013	also	for	stakes	in	the	3-5%	range.	However,	due	to	the	


















e-mail	 invitation	 for	 the	 survey.	 Furthermore,	 the	 survey	 specifies	 that	 the	 research	 is	
conducted	from	a	portfolio	investment	perspective	and	invites	the	Chief	Investment	Officer	or	
another	Board	Member	 to	 complete	 the	 survey	and	 in	 the	 face-to-face	 interviews,	questions	
are	asked	from	an	asset	management	perspective.	






From	 our	 study,	 we	 distil	 several	 conditions	 for	 investors	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 pursue	 an	
investment	 strategy	 aimed	 at	 long-term	 value	 creation.	 Investors	 can	 realise	 long-term	
investment	 returns	 by	 investing	 in	 and	 engaging	with	 companies	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 adding	
value	over	the	long-term,	thereby	having	a	positive	effect	on	the	value	of	their	portfolios	and	
on	society.	
A	 first	 condition	 is	an	 intended	buy-and-hold	approach	with	a	 typical	holding	period	of	more	





A	 third	 condition	 is	 effective	 engagement	 with	 invested	 companies	 on	 the	 long-term,	 both	
behind	 the	 scenes	 by	meeting	with	 companies	 and	 in	 the	 annual	 general	meeting	by	 voting.	
This	requires	human	resources,	expertise	and	time.		
A	 fourth	 condition	 is	 performance	 analysis	 based	 on	 companies’	 value-added	 in	 the	 real	




A	 fifth	 condition	 is	 alignment	 of	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	 asset	 owner	 or	 client	 and	 the	 asset	
manager.	 Our	 survey	 indicates	 that	 asset	 managers	 are	 primarily	 motivated	 by	 their	
beneficiaries	 (asset	owners	or	clients)	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	creation.	Another	 important	


























with	 take-over	defenses,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 in	 the	debate	 about	 the	
protection	of	exchange-listed	firms	against	hostile	takeovers	that	these	protectons	are	
most	relevant	for	firms	with	fewer	blockholders.	
3. To	pursue	 long-term	value	creation,	 it	 is	 important	 that	asset	owners,	asset	managers	
and	 companies	 are	 aligned	 on	 a	 long-term	mandate,	 which	 includes	 ESG	 factors	 and	









6. New	 investment	 approaches	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 differently	 educating	 (young)	









7	 At	 the	 implementation,	 the	 lessons	 learned	 from	 current	 practices	 (e.g.	 loyalty	 shares	 given	 to	 the	
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returns	(1)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Environmental	impact	
(e.g.	climate	change	and	
biodiversity	loss)	(2)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Outperforming	










o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Interests	of	employees	
(6)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	



































































































































































o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...on	the	shares	of	
companies	we		know	





o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
…with	companies	that	
are	under	performing	


























	 We	would	not	invest	(1)	 We	are	indifferent	(2)	 We	would	be	more	likely	to	invest	(3)	
Binding	nomination	(1)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Anti-takeover	preferred	
shares	(2)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Certificates	(3)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Priority	shares	(4)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Loyalty	voting	rights	(5)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Pyramid	structure	(6)		 o 	 o 	 o 	






























































o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
A	long-term	value	creation	
strategy	is	our	insurance	











o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	feel	it	is	our	obligation	to	
society	to	pursue	long	term-
value	creation	(10)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Professional	networks	inspire	
us	to	engage	in	long-term	
value	creation	(11)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
End	of	Block	
Closing	Questions	
	
	In	case	you	would	be	interested	in	receiving	the	results	of	this	survey,	please	fill	in	your	e-mail.	
________________________________________________________________	
	
	
Were	any	of	the	questions	unclear	or	do	you	have	any	other	suggestions	or	remarks?	
________________________________________________________________	
________________________________________________________________	
End	of	Block	
End	of	survey	–	Thank	you	very	much	for	your	participation		
